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THE "NORMAL" SUCCESSES AND FAILURES OF FEMINISM
AND THE CRIMINAL LAW
VICTORIA NOURSE*
INTRODUCTION
To write of feminist reform in the criminal law is to write of
simultaneous success and failure. We have seen marked changes in
the doctrines and the practice of rape law, domestic violence law, and
the law of self-defense.' There is not a criminal law casebook in
America today, nor a state statute book, that does not tell this story.2
Yet for all of this success, we also live in a world in which reform
seems to suffer routine failures. Many believe, for example, that
feminist reforms have rid rape law of the resistance requirement;
however, recent scholarship makes it clear that the resistance
requirement has not disappeared.' Similarly, many believe that
feminism has rid us of the marital rape exemption; in fact, there is
evidence that marital rape immunities remain on the statute books.4
Finally, many believe that reform has brought widespread judicial
acceptance of battered women's self-defense claims; but the battle
over this defense in the law reviews and popular media testifies to the
continuing lack of settlement of the underlying issues.'
* My thanks to Anita Bernstein for reading and commenting on this Essay and to
Roseann Kitson for excellent research assistance.
1. Even its skeptics have conceded that feminism has been one of the most influential
developments in the past fifty years of the criminal law. See George P. Fletcher, The Fall and
Rise of Criminal Theory, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 275, 279 (1998) ("The only academic
movement of the 1980s that made an impact on criminal law was feminism."); Sanford H.
Kadish, Fifty Years of Criminal Law: An Opinionated Review, 87 CAL. L. REv. 943, 974 (1999)
("Feminism, on the other hand, is the one major movement of the period that has had a
significant impact on the shape of the criminal law.").
2. See, e.g., JOHN KAPLAN ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 609-35
(defensive force), 1099-1155 (rape) (3d ed. 1996); MYRON MOSKOVITZ, CASES AND PROBLEMS
IN CRIMINAL LAW 385-424 (self defense), 721-52 (rape) (4th ed. 1999).
3. See infra text accompanying notes 13-14.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 46-64.
5. See, e.g., JAMES Q. WILSON, MORAL JUDGMENT: DOES THE ABUSE EXCUSE
THREATEN OUR LEGAL SYSTEM? 62-66, 101-12 (1997) (deploring the development of battered
woman syndrome evidence in the context of self-defense); David L. Faigman & Amy J. Wright,
The Battered Woman Syndrome in the Age of Science, 39 ARIZ. L. REv. 67, 68 (1997) (urging
that courts abandon battered woman syndrome); see also infra text accompanying note 88.
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Some have seen these events as reason for pronouncing feminism
a failure despite its obvious successes. In my view, the interesting
questions are about how reform both succeeds and fails,
simultaneously and obviously. Indeed, the very transparency of these
conflicts should merit our attention not only for feminism's sake, but
also for the sake of understanding how law maintains apparent
consistency and, at the same time, perpetuates injustice. One need
not be a sophisticated feminist to see the difficulties of a rape law that
declares women need not resist but then requires resistance, or the
deceptiveness of a legal consensus that announces marital rape
exemptions have been discarded when they have not. These are test
cases in how the law carries forward that which it denies. For
feminists, they are test cases in how the law perpetuates sexism as it
proclaims sexism dead.
These are large questions that cannot be tackled in a short essay.
I want to suggest here, however, a couple of angles to the problem as
they relate to feminism. Old norms do not die; they are resurrected
in empty spaces, deliberate ambiguities, and new rhetorics.6 Indeed,
old norms not only do not die, but also live alongside, and are
perpetuated by, the denial that they still live. It is in this sense that
we may come to see the failures of feminist reform as essentially
"normal." By this, I do not mean that the recurring problems of
feminism and the criminal law are a good thing. Rather, I use
"normal" in two senses of the word. First, these failures are "normal"
in the sense that they arise from upwardly mobile social norms-in
this case, norms about intimate relationships. Social norms have the
power to overwhelm the best-intentioned of reforms. When rules
that were supposed to go away nevertheless stay (such as resistance
rules or marital rape exemptions), they stay because the new rules are
interpreted in light of old, apparently discarded, social
understandings. Failure is also "normal" in a second sense, the sense
that it is not accidental but structurally determined. Reform is
typically a "marbled" affair-the rich veins of new law cut across the
"plain vanilla" of settled, conventional belief. This is a function not
only of the power of social norms, but also the demands of the
institutional processes essential to create reform. Legislatures cannot
survive without the compromises and deliberate ambiguities that
6. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy,
105 YALE L.J. 2117 (1996). Although I do believe that rhetoric changes over time in ways that
"preserve" older norms, my work here avoids the historical; I am interested, instead, in the
simultaneity of contrary social and legal norms.
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nurture reform's future failures.
If this is right, feminist reforms have a kind of built-in, albeit
unpredictable, capacity for failure; like the apple harboring the worm,
they harbor the possibility of their own undoing. I say this not
because I believe that failure's normalcy makes reform futile, but for
precisely the opposite reason-because it makes the need for
continued reform equally "normal." In what follows, I examine this
possibility-the possibility of simultaneous success and failure-in
three particular contexts: rape reform, marital rape reform, and
reforms relating to battered woman syndrome evidence.
SUCCESSES AND FAILURES
There are two major areas in which feminism's influence in the
statutory criminal law is seen as important: rape and self-defense law.7
There are reasons, I believe, to doubt this emphasis. I have argued
elsewhere and continue to believe that this very categorization
marginalizes the feminist problem.8 Feminist issues can be found in
the criminal law every time a criminal statute touches an intimate
relationship, that is, a relationship governed by society's norms about
the proper relationship of men and women, whether the "doctrinal"
issue falls under the heading of murder or manslaughter, self-defense
or provocation. Here, however, I will focus on the traditional areas in
which reform has been claimed and consider common claims of
success against reality.
A. Rape and Resistance: Deliberate Ambiguities
Rape reform is often cited as the most obvious example of
feminist influence on the criminal law. 9 And there is no doubt that
reform efforts of the 1970s and 1980s made substantial changes in
doctrine and statute.10 At least as a formal matter, these reform
7. See KAPLAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 609-35, 1099-1155; MOSKOVITZ, supra note 2, at
385-424,721-52.
& See Victoria Nourse, Feminism and the Criminal Law, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME
AND JUSTICE (rev. ed. forthcoming 2001); see also Victoria Nourse, Passion's Progress: Modem
Law Reform and the Provocation Defense, 106 YALE L.J. 1331, 1334 (1997).
9. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 1, at 279 (citing, as the first evidence of feminism's
influence, Susan Estrich's critique of rape law); Kadish, supra note 1, at 953 (equating feminism
with changing "the law of rape in America.").
10. See Julie Homey & Cassia Spohn, Rape Law Reform and Instrumental Change in Six
Urban Jurisdictions, 25 LAW & SOC'Y REv. 117 (1991), reprinted in part in LAW & SOCIETY:
READINGS ON THE SOCIAL STUDY OF LAW 522, 522 (Stewart Macaulay et al. eds., 1995)
[hereinafter LAW & SOCIETY] ("During the past twenty years there has been a sweeping effort
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efforts ousted the worst doctrinal requirements: the prompt
complaint rule, corroboration requirements and even jury instructions
suggesting the incredibility of the charge.1' Surprisingly, large
discrepancies remain between these reforms and the law as it stands
today in practice. Indeed, this is becoming a staple of traditional
criminal law scholarship. For example, Steven Schulhofer has
recently argued, in book-length treatment, that rape law suffers from
a kind of "myth of reform," in which adherents and critics alike
appear to join hands in celebrating a set of reforms that should be
seen as partial at best.12
One prominent example of such a "myth" is the resistance
requirement; another is the very definition of force. Although courts
and commentators have seemed to assume that the resistance
requirement is virtually dead, 3 we are now told by the criminal law
academy that feminists never really rid rape law of the resistance rule.
Schulhofer writes: "'resistance to the utmost' is an untenable
requirement that no modern court would attempt to enforce, but the
law still puts the burden on the woman to resist in some fashion.' 14
Similarly, if reformers thought that they shifted the focus from force
to reform rape laws in this country.").
11. See SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 42 (1987) (noting that resistance, prompt complaint,
and corroboration rules have formally been repealed); STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED
SEX: THE CULTURE OF INTIMIDATION AND THE FAILURE OF LAW 29-30 (1998). "The
corroboration requirement and special cautionary instructions to the jury came under concerted
attack, and in the course of the 1970s virtually every state repealed these discriminatory rules."
Id. at 30.
12. SCHULHOFER, supra note 11, at 1 (stating that "[diespite three decades of intensive
public discussion and numerous statutory reforms, the problem of rape has not been 'solved."').
Schulhofer's point is consistent with feminist scholarship. See, e.g., LINDA R. HIRSHMAN &
JANE E. LARSON, HARD BARGAINS: THE POLITICS OF SEX 270 (1998) ("To the degree that
past rape reforms have begun from or continued the common law understanding of rape as
forcible sexual imposition, they do not correspond to modem understandings of what is right
and wrong about heterosexual conduct."); Michelle J. Anderson, Reviving Resistance in Rape
Law, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 953, 960 ("Rape law reformers sought and won only a partial
victory.").
13. See, e.g., People v. Barnes, 721 P.2d 110, 118 (Cal. 1986) (describing the California
legislature's repeal of the resistance requirement and explaining the various reasons why "the
entire concept of resistance to sexual assault has been called into question"); PAUL H.
ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW § 14.6, at 752 (1997) ("To require resistance, as some jurisdictions
once did, is to require victims to put themselves in danger of additional injuries .... (emphasis
added)).
14. SCHULHOFER, supra note 11, at 176 (emphasis added). "Many states continue to
require a 'reasonable' amount of physical resistance. And where the law on the books has
abolished formal resistance requirements, some resistance-physical and otherwise-remains
necessary in practice .... Id. at 127; see also Anderson, supra note 12, at 957 ("Reformers
changed courts' evaluation of resistance by degree, but not in kind."). Indeed, some states still
require "earnest resistance" by statute. Id. at 965 & n.69 ("States that maintain an earnest
resistance requirement in their statutes today include Alabama, Oregon, and West Virginia.").
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to consent, they have not; many obviously wrongful threats still do
not, in and of themselves, support a rape charge. For example, the
school principal who obtains sex by threatening his pupil that she will
not graduate does not commit rape, 15 nor does the supervisor who
obtains sex by threatening to fire his subordinate.16 Of course, we
have known of this for some time. If it was not already clear from
Catharine MacKinnon's theoretical critique," it was crystal clear in
Susan Estrich's work, Real Rape,1 that resistance might reassert itself
and that coercive threats might remain unpunished.
The question I want to ask is not whether this has happened but
why it has happened. In my own view, resistance has resurfaced not
because courts have failed, because feminism's theories of rape are
wrong, or because all would be better if we simply treated rape as a
crime against autonomy. Schulhofer seems to be on to something
when he emphasizes society's continuing ambivalence about social
norms of consent and coercion-the very basic concepts upon which
rape law depends. 9 For all of the work on rape reform legislation, the
legal concepts of force and consent were left largely untouched in the
1970s and 1980s.20 Not surprisingly, perhaps, courts have found
themselves reaching out to resistance to give some content to the
conceptual ambiguities left behind. Resistance has resurfaced to
resolve the normative ambivalence of force and consent-if the victim
physically resists, courts and juries believe they can be fairly sure that
she did not consent and that physical force was used to accomplish
sex.
21
15. See State v. Thompson, 792 P.2d 1103, 1104 (Mont. 1990); SCHULHOFER, supra note 11,
at 2-3.
16. See Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 507 (9th Cir. 1994); SCHULHOFER, supra note 11, at
132-34.
17. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281
(1991).
18. ESTRICH, supra note 11, at 18-19 (describing studies showing prosecutors' reliance on
the victim's resistance), 67-71 (discussing the inadequacies of the "physical force" rule in simple
rape cases).
19. SCHULHOFER, supra note 11, at 47-68.
20. See id. at 31-36.
21. Courts have long recognized that "[t]he importance of resistance lay in its relationship
to the issues of force and consent .... By establishing resistance, the state was able to prove the
key elements of the crime: the accused's intent to use force in order to accomplish an act of
sexual intercourse, and the woman's nonconsent .. " People v. Barnes, 721 P.2d 110, 115 (Cal.
1986). It is for this reason that some writers have recently urged that we revive the resistance
requirement and reverse its logic. Michelle Anderson argues that, rather than seeking to
exclude claims by women who do not resist, the law should find that resistance, verbal or
physical, includes those claims-that "resistance cannot be necessary to obtain conviction, but it
should be sufficient." Anderson, supra note 12, at 960. The argument addressed here focuses
on resistance as an exclusionary, rather than an inclusionary, rule.
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In this world, resistance becomes the law's measure both of force
and of nonconsent, long after it has been officially ousted from our
doctrine. There is no doubt that resistance seems like a "bright line,"
but it is only as "bright" as the norms upon which it depends. Put
another way, the resurgence of resistance assumes and requires the
"scripts" of female and male responsibility that Lynne Henderson
warned us about so long ago.22 Being a date or a wife or even a
colleague means that courts and lawyers and jurors presume that
interactions between the two parties are voluntary, consensual, and
"normal," which means no coercion, no rape. In other words, the
relationship, implied or real, spells consent to which resistance
provides counterproof. This is not simply a theoretical point: ask a
prosecutor about the key problem in a nonstranger rape case, and she
will tell you, "'It all comes down to the same nitty-gritty nuts-and-
bolts issues: the relationship between the parties is going to be key in
any rape prosecution.' '' 3
From there, it is not hard to see why jurors or judges look for
"her resistance"-it negates the implications of the relationship.2 4 If
victims are assumed to have consented to have sex with those they are
dating, then, by resisting, the victim tends to make us see that we
should not be so ready to infer consent simply from the prior
22. Lynne Henderson, Rape and Responsibility, 11 LAW& PHIL. 127, 131 (1992).
23. Lisa R. Eskow, Note, The Ultimate Weapon?: Demythologizing Spousal Rape and
Reconceptualizing Its Prosecution, 48 STAN. L. REV. 677, 699 (1996) (quoting Frank Passaglia,
Director of the Sexual Assault Unit at the San Francisco District Attorney's Office). Empirical
work tends to confirm this judgment. Early studies of rape reform focused on "objective"
measures like conviction rates and tended to show no "progress." Homey & Spohn, supra note
10, at 535 ("[L]egal changes did not produce the dramatic results anticipated by reformers.").
Later studies have revised that estimate on one score: that rape reform has had some effect in
producing "a climate more conducive to the full prosecution of simple rape" (what I would call
cases of "relationship-rape"). Cassia C. Spohn & Julie Homey, The Impact of Rape Law
Reform on the Processing of Simple and Aggravated Rape Cases, 86 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 861, 884 (1996) (finding "some evidence," id. at 882, that rape reforms have
increased the number of relationship-rapes in the system through increased reporting and
changes in police and prosecutor attitudes-even if conviction and dismissal rates remain
unaffected by legal changes).
24. One may ask, if relationships have such a powerful force, why have courts required
resistance even in so-called "stranger" cases? Schulhofer, for example, opens his book with an
example of a woman accosted by a stranger and carried into the woods; she was overcome by
fear and did not resist the stranger's sexual attack. The jury convicted the defendant of sexual
assault, but the appellate court reversed the verdict finding no force, presumably because the
victim did not resist. Put another way, it was the victim's responsibility to show by her actions
that this was not a voluntary "romp in the woods." SCHULHOFER, supra note 11, at 1-2
(discussing People v. Warren, 446 N.E.2d 591 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983)). Therein lies the painful
possibility that the law presumes that women are in voluntary sexual relationships unless they
prove to the contrary. The baseline here is the "romp in the woods" or voluntary sexual
adventure; in short, the norm is that women are "in" a relationship unless they prove to the
contrary.
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relationship. The relationship provides the normative baseline from
which consent and force are abstracted. Of course, as feminists have
noted, it also places the burden on the victim to "prove" that she did
not consent and that the rape was committed by force 5 Here, as
elsewhere, the law places the onus on the victim to negate the
implications of relationship; violent and otherwise, relationships are
her responsibility from which she can only abstract her identity (even
her physical autonomy) by showing physical force.
This analysis extends as well to the problems that have arisen in
the context of defining force in the law of rape. Traditionally, only
physical force has sufficed to meet rape law's idea of what constitutes
illegal force.26 Of course, this leaves out a good deal of what most
normal Americans would call "coercion"; indeed, it leaves out what
the criminal law-in fraud, extortion, and robbery-calls "force." 2 A
high school girl believes she will lose her diploma if she does not have
sex: no rape because no physical force.28 A child believes she will be
returned to a detention home if she does not have sex: no rape
because no physical force.29 An employee believes that she will lose
her job: no rape because no physical force.30 All of these cases
involve legitimate, socially-sanctioned relationships between victim
and offender (student/teacher, employee/employer, foster-
child/parent). Those relationships provide the baseline of
"voluntary" interaction (implied consent) that the victim must rebut
by showing something that is obviously inconsistent with consent-
physical force. But think about that: does anyone really think that the
25. See, e.g., ESTRICH, supra note 11, at 69-71; MacKinnon, supra note 17, at 1303-04.
26. See, e.g., State v. Thompson, 792 P.2d 1103, 1106 (Mont. 1990) (defining "force" as
physical compulsion because the Montana rape statute failed to define the term); Jane E.
Larson, "Women Understand So Little, They Call My Good Nature 'Deceit"': A Feminist
Rethinking of Seduction, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 374, 417-18 (1993) ("Today, however, courts rarely
consider it unlawful to deceive someone into agreeing to sex .... It is both a tort and a crime to
take money by false pretenses, but in most jurisdictions it is lawful to obtain consent to sex by
intentionally deceiving one's partner.").
27. See Patricia J. Falk, Rape by Fraud and Rape by Coercion, 64 BROOK. L. REv. 39, 139
(1998) (explaining that courts have applied constructive force requirements in the context of
robbery and burglary to include fraudulent representations but have not always applied this
same concept in the case of sex induced by fraud); Larson, supra note 26, at 417 ("Although
force and fraud are equated when it comes to money, the same analysis is not usually extended
to sex.").
28. See State v. Thompson, 792 P.2d 1103 (Mont. 1990). The Montana statute was
subsequently amended to include a definition of "force" in an attempt to solve this problem.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-501 (1999).
29. See Commonwealth v. Mlinarich, 498 A.2d 395 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985), affd, 542 A.2d
1335 (Pa. 1988).
30. See Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503 (9th Cir. 1994); SCHULHOFER, supra note 11, at 133-
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girl in the 4-H club (conned into intercourse with a "doctor" she met
there) really wanted to have sex?31 If what was taken from her were
money, of course, these would be crimes of fraud or extortion. And
yet, rape law's idea of force-as-physical-force leaves us with the
unpalatable conclusion that the same conduct should fare differently
when what is obtained is sex.32
Few believe that the resistance requirement should be a part of
rape doctrine; even fewer believe that the girl taken off her bike at
the local park has not been raped because she did not resist. If I am
right that the general consensus condemns these rules and results,
why is it that the law continues to embrace them-decades after
declared feminist "success" in the revision of the criminal law?33
Indeed, the kinds of problems I am talking about are exceedingly
conventional, even pass6, from a feminist standpoint. Here arises the
question of banal inequalities-inequalities that, if seen, would be
condemned but yet somehow escape reform. We know that the law
takes its cues from the social relationships involved; and we have long
known, from law and society scholarship, just how powerful social
norms are in defeating the best-laid plans at reform.34 The question
here is not simply about the power of norms to shape law or how our
notion of intimate relationships shapes the criminal law. Instead, it is
how outdated norms may perpetuate themselves in a world that would,
all other things being equal, reject them. The 4-H club case and the
31. Schulhofer discusses this case in which the defendant, Waites, who met his victim and
others at a 4-H club, posed as a doctor who was testing the victim for learning disabilities and,
based on that pretext, ordered the victim to disrobe, fondled her, and subjected her to fellatio
and intercourse. Waites was convicted of rape, but the conviction was overturned by the
appellate court because there was no "force." See SCHULHOFER, supra note 11, at 45 (citing
State v. Waites, No. 93-L-009, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 3651, at *15-21 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 19,
1994)).
32 See ESTRICH, supra note 11, at 70; Larson, supra note 26, at 417-18.
33. Although some state courts have openly struggled with the problem of "force," and
some legislatures have even attempted to deal with obvious loopholes, the most common type
of reform addressing issues of coercion in rape focuses on defined categories of those most
likely to abuse trust, such as psychiatrists, or ministers, or school teachers, or general provisions
relating to specific classes of victims, such as children. See Falk, supra note 27, at 118-19 ("No
doubt wary of casting their nets too wide, state legislatures have been quite conservative,
tending to enact very specific provisions to cover a few factual scenarios rather than passing
global fraud statutes."). Indeed, the very fact that legislatures have sought to limit their reforms
to particular kinds of relationships (for example, psychiatrist/patient), reflects and reaffirms the
notion that the relationships between the parties provide the norms that govern our judgments
about the propriety of sexual relationships. See id.
34. See Lawrence Friedman, Law Reform in Historical Perspective, 13 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
351, 364-65 (1969) (arguing that reform is typically "half ratification" of an existing social order
and half "real change."); see id. at 365 ("A change that conforms to what most of the public
already wishes to do or which calls for slight, familiar, acceptable change of behavior is far more
palatable and far more likely to succeed.").
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detention-home case are not difficult cases for most people. But
courts have not found these cases to be easy bellwethers of injustice;
indeed, some have found no difficulty in rejecting resistance as
doctrinal rule and then reinventing it for the most vulnerable-for
young girls threatened with no diplomas or detention homes or
violating "doctor's" orders.
One possible answer to this development may simply be vision;
the old, discarded norms (the rules about resistance) are in some way
"hidden," conventionally believed to be discarded or long-ago-
reformed. After all, courts reinventing the resistance requirement do
not say that they are reinventing the doctrinal rule; they say that they
are applying the basic notions of force and consent. 5 Similarly, courts
applying the stranger-rape-as-paradigm rule do not say that rape only
happens outside voluntary relationships; they say that they are
defining force.36 Outdated norms resurface but remain undisclosed in
newer, more ambiguous guises. Here, the discarded norms are
"hidden" within places of ambiguity--the capacious and socially
controversial notions of force and consent. The law that disavows
sexism (by rejecting the doctrinal resistance requirement) ends up
recapitulating it (by silently reinventing it within the space provided
by law's ambiguities).
If that is right, we may begin to see why reform carries the seeds
of its own failures. Almost all controversial legislation-and that
includes rape reform-is purchased at the cost of deliberate
ambiguity. No piece of major legislation can obtain the collective
consensus required by legislatures without compromise.37 In my view,
35. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d 1338 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (Where
"[t]he victim did not physically resist, but rather continued to verbally protest," id. at 1340, the
court found insufficient evidence of rape; the court characterized the issue as whether there was
a sufficient "degree of physical force necessary to complete the act of rape in Pennsylvania." Id.
at 1339 (emphasis added)), affid in part and vacated in part by Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 641
A.2d 1161, 1163-64 (Pa. 1994) (rejecting the notion that the victim must resist as a rule, but then
immediately considering her lack of "physical action" against the defendant in upholding
finding of no "force" and therefore no rape).
36. See, e.g., State v. Alston, 312 S.E.2d 470 (N.C. 1984) (The court specifically notes that
prior consent to sex in a consensual relationship does not negate a charge of rape, id. at 475, but
finds that defendant did not use "force" in accomplishing sexual intercourse, id. at 476.).
37. This is not only a product of collective action problems within legislatures, but also a
more general problem with any legal reform in areas of intense social conflict. See ROBERT
AXELROD, THE COMPLEXITY OF COOPERATION: AGENT-BASED MODELS OF COMPETITION
AND COLLABORATION 61 (1997) ("In most cases, the law can only work as a supplement (and
not a replacement) for informal enforcement of the norm... law is the formalization of what
has already attained strength as a social or political norm."); Stewart Macaulay, Law and
Behavioral Sciences: Is There Any There There?, reprinted in part in LAW & SOCIETY, supra
note 10, at 14, 15 ("Our society deals with conflict in many ways, but avoidance and evasion are
important ones .... We find social consensus at a high level of abstraction and so keep our
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there is no shame in these compromises; they are inevitable and
essential.38 The problem is that deliberate ambiguity, purchased now
for a small sum, may exact much larger costs in the future. Indeed, it
may become the nurturing grounds for the reform failures of the next
generation. For within the heart of that ambiguity, old norms will live
on, upwardly mobile and yet unseen.
That old, discarded norms might survive post-reform is not only
predictable because legislatures trade in deliberate ambiguity, but
also because ambiguity nurtures overtly rejected norms. Ambiguity
works to hide discarded or unlikely norms by making it difficult to
obtain the information about precisely what the norm is. As scholars
of norm development tell us, lack of information and publicity may
"be a determinative obstacle to societal norm formation. '' 39 If, for
example, everyone believes that the resistance requirement has been
eliminated, then they are very unlikely to support the need for further
reform, even if it is quite clear that they would support such reform if
all the information were well-known. The law can exacerbate this
situation by inhibiting information flow-by burying the old rules
within new and deliberately ambiguous guises. If everyone believes
that rape law has been "reformed" to eliminate the resistance
requirement, and the law only reinvents the resistance requirement in
difficult-to-see places like "force and consent," then norms
challenging the consensus will be weak (even if we can predict that
they would be strong in the presence of full information). 4° Indeed,
the great irony is that the very idea of "reform" - to the extent that it
suggests that we have "solved" a problem of major societal
controversy-nurtures its own contradictions by tending to inhibit the
doctrines ambiguous or contradictory.").
38. To the extent that legal authorities seek to minimize conflict with "citizens' hostility"
they may actually maximize compliance with a partial shift in norms that would not otherwise
be possible. See, e.g., TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990), reprinted in part in
LAW & SOcIETY, supra note 10, at 474, 476 ("If the effectiveness of legal authorities ultimately
depends on voluntary acceptance of their actions, then authorities are placed in the position of
balancing public support against the effective regulation of public behavior.").
39. Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH.
L. REV. 338, 402 (1997); see also ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How
NEIGHBORS SETrLE DISPUTES 180 (1991) ("Players need information as well as effective
power. In the absence of adequate information, a continuing relationship among empowered
people may not be cooperative."); id. at 181 ("The hypothesis predicts that departures from
conditions of reciprocal power, ready sanctioning opportunities, and adequate information are
likely to impair the emergence of welfare-maximizing norms.").
40. See AXELROD, supra note 37, at 58-59 (arguing that "social proof," the proof of
correctness of social behavior gleaned from observing others, "is a major mechanism in the
support of norms," because it provides information to the actor seeking to comply with
prevailing social norms).
[Vol. 75:951
2000] THE "NORMAL" SUCCESSES AND FAILURES OF FEMINISM 961
flow of information about its own inevitable "compromises."
In short, what amounts to a necessary feature of the legislative
process is likely to breed and nurture a condition of reform's
simultaneous victories and defeats. In this sense, it seems almost
predictable that rape reform would cycle between success and failure.
Predictable perhaps, but unfortunate nevertheless: unfortunate
because it sustains law's hypocrisy; more than unfortunate because it
renders banal a set of inequalities whose casualties may be the most
vulnerable among us.
B. Marital Rape: Complexity
If the resurgence of the resistance requirement tells us something
about the power of ambiguity to nurture older, discarded norms, then
the fate of marital rape rules tells a similar story under a different
title. One of the very earliest crusades in the area of rape law focused
on the obvious inequalities of a law that failed to protect married
women from rape. Eliminating marital rape exemptions was a
noteworthy part of many rape reform efforts in the 1970s and 1980s.41
These efforts quickly appeared to be quite successful, with courts
doing the heavy-lifting of reform. In the leading case of People v.
Liberta,42 the New York Court of Appeals held that marital rape
exemptions violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.43
The Liberta case has since been followed by a number of courts;44 and
41. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 11, at 30 (stating that the marital exemption was one of
the two principal problems focused on by rape reformers in the 1970s).
42. 474 N.E.2d 567 (N.Y. 1984).
43. Id. at 573 (holding that no rational basis exists to distinguish marital rape and
nonmarital rape, thus marital exemption in New York statute violates the Equal Protection
Clause); see also People v. DeStefano, 467 N.Y.S.2d 506, 515-16 (Suffolk County Ct. 1983)
(holding that a wife has a right to the protection that law provides against rape for non-spouses
and is denied equal protection of the law by the existence of a husband's statutory immunity in
the case of marital rape).
44. See, e.g., Merton v. State, 500 So. 2d 1301 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986) (holding that there is
no rational basis for distinguishing between marital and nonmarital rape, thus a marital
exemption violates equal protection); Williams v. State, 494 So. 2d 819, 830 (Ala. Crim. App.
1986) (holding that a marital exemption to forcible sodomy statute had no rational basis and
thus violated equal protection); People v. M. D., 595 N.E.2d 702, 713 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992)
(marital distinction between lesser sexual assault offenses violates equal protection); People v.
Horvath, 584 N.Y.S.2d 148, 149 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (extending Liberta to sexual abuse in the
first degree); Shunn v. State, 742 P.2d 775, 778 (Wyo. 1987) (agreeing with Liberta that no
rational basis exists for distinguishing marital rape and nonmarital rape). But see People v.
Flowers, 644 P.2d 916, 918 (Colo. 1982) (en banc) (holding that the marital rape exemption is
neither arbitrary nor irrational); People v. Brown, 632 P.2d 1025, 1027 (Colo. 1981) (en banc)
(upholding marital rape exemption under rational basis review).
A number of courts have relied upon arguments similar to those asserted in Liberta to
construe statutes or common law crimes to avoid inequalities of treatment between marital and
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its rationale has been applied not only to full marital exemptions, but
also to marital immunities for lower-level rape crimes. Where
statutes create marital exemptions for crimes other than first-degree
rape, courts have found that these exemptions also violate equal
protection. 4
The only problem with this story is that it is incomplete, although
it is repeated so often that it has become as good as the truth.
Proponents and detractors alike extol the demise of the marital rape
exemption 46 as reason to celebrate feminist victory or to declare an
end to the need for statutory reform. However, the ideas that shape
the marital exemption have not died and, if the equal protection cases
are any measure, obvious inequalities remain on the nation's statute
books.47 In Virginia, the judge, if he or she thinks it in the best
nonmarital rape. See, e.g., State v. Rider, 449 So. 2d 903, 907 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)
(rejecting common law "marital unity" and privacy arguments for marital rape exemption);
State v. Smith, 401 So. 2d 1126, 1128-29 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (rejecting common law
arguments for interspousal exception to Florida sexual battery statute); Warren v. State, 336
S.E.2d 221, 223, 226 (Ga. 1985) (holding that no implicit marital exclusion exists in either rape
or aggravated sodomy statutes while citing with approval cases striking down such exclusions on
equal protection grounds); State v. Willis, 394 N.W.2d 648, 650 (Neb. 1986) (refusing to
recognize a spousal exemption from a statute and stating that "none of the justifications for the
exclusion have any merit in modem society"); Weishaupt v. Commonwealth, 315 S.E.2d 847,
852-55 (Va. 1984) (rejecting common law justifications for marital rape exception as inconsistent
with autonomy and equal rights of women); see also Commonwealth v. Shoemaker, 518 A.2d
591, 594-95 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (rejecting defendant's argument that criminalizing marital rape
violated his rights of privacy and equal protection).
45. See, e.g., M. D., 595 N.E.2d at 713 (holding that Illinois violates equal protection when
it applies the marital exemption to less serious sexual abuse offenses); People v. Naylor, 609
N.Y.S.2d 954, 956 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (holding marital exemption does not apply to third-
degree sexual abuse; such exception would violate the Equal Protection Clause); Horvath, 584
N.Y.S.2d at 149 (extending Liberta's equal protection holding to deny a "marital immunity"
defense to a prosecution for "sexual abuse in the first degree"); People v. Bruce, 556 N.Y.S.2d
782, 783 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (rejecting lower court's reversal of jury finding on attempted
rape in the first degree because of its concern about the "marital context" and relying upon
Liberta's equal protection rationale albeit implicitly extending it to the "attempted rape"
context); People v. Prudent, 539 N.Y.S.2d 651, 651 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1989) (rejecting defendant's
argument that Liberta's equal protection rationale does not apply to lesser sexual offenses).
46. It is conventional wisdom among criminal law scholars that the marital rape exemption
is dead or at least dying. See, e.g., Donald A. Dripps, Beyond Rape: An Essay on the Difference
Between the Presence of Force and the Absence of Consent, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1780, 1783
(1992) ("The reformed statutes did make some substantive changes by abolishing the marital
rape exemption .... ).
47. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 11, at 43 ("[T]he great majority of the states still retain
an exemption for marital rape under some circumstances."); Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and
Consent A Legal History of Marital Rape, 88 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming Oct. 2000)
(manuscript at 1, on file with author) ("A majority of states still retain some form of the
common law regime: they criminalize a narrower range of offenses if committed within
marriage, subject the marital rape they do recognize to less serious sanctions, and/or create
special procedural hurdles for marital rape prosecutions."). Robin West's influential article on
equal protection and marital rape first set forth the problem. See Robin L. West, Equality
Theory, Marital Rape, and the Promise of the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 FLA. L. REv. 45
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interest of the parties' marriage, may dismiss some marital charges
altogether even in cases where the court has made a finding of guilt.
48
Similarly, in Arizona, spousal rape with force may be a misdemeanor
while nonspousal rape without force is a serious felony.
49
The differentials in penalties are not the only ways in which
marital rape offenses are treated separately. Some offenses that are
treated as rape or wrongful sexual contact for strangers are treated
differently if the parties are married or, in some cases, living together.
Occasionally, an immunity will still arise on the surface of the statute.
For example, Louisiana still exempts a husband from guilt for a
''simple rape" and other sexual offenses by excepting married persons
from the coverage of the simple rape statute. 0 However, the more
common statutory disparity is found when statutes limit the repeal of
an exemption, creating one set of rules for married women and
another for single women. For example, Mississippi has retained its
defense of marriage statute exempting "legal spouse[s]" from any
sexual battery offense.51 That statute is then qualified as if in repeal
of itself by providing an exception for "forcible sexual penetration
(1990).
48. In a marital rape case tried to a Virginia court, despite a finding of guilt, the court may
defer proceedings and place the defendant on probation if the victim and the State consent.
Upon completion of probation and therapy, the court may, without the consent of the victim,
dismiss the charges if it will "promote maintenance of the family unit" and serve the best
interests of the "complaining witness." VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.2:1(C) (Michie 1996). This
applies to cases in which prosecutors proceed under the special spousal statute or under the
more traditional statutes, including aggravated cases. See id. §§ 18.2-61(D); 18.2-67.1(D); 18.2-
67.2(D). This scheme clearly allows the judge the discretion to permit his views of the parties'
relationship to overcome a finding of guilt of marital rape.
49. The Arizona statute defining a spousal sexual assault (intercourse or oral sexual
contact) accomplished by force or threatened force is a class six felony which may be reduced, at
the discretion of the judge, to a misdemeanor with mandatory counseling. ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-1406.01(B) (West 1989). (LEXIS indicates that this statute is current through 1999).
The standard nonspousal sexual assault statute, which does not require force but simply sex
without consent, is a class two felony. Id. § 13-1406(B).
50. Louisiana defines a "simple rape" as "a rape committed when the anal or vaginal
sexual intercourse is deemed to be without the lawful consent of a victim who is not the spouse
of the offender." LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:43(A) (West 1997 & Supp. 2000) (emphasis added).
A similar marital exemption exists for sexual battery and oral sexual battery, which are typically
nonpenetration touching offenses but may also include cases that fall out of the definition of
vaginal or anal intercourse. Id. § 14.43.1(A) ("Sexual battery is the intentional engaging in any
of the following acts with another person, who is not the spouse of the offender, where the
offender acts without the consent of the victim." (emphasis added)); id. § 14:43.3(A) ("Oral
sexual battery is the intentional engaging in any of the following acts with another person, who
is not the spouse of the offender...."). Such exclusions do not apply, however, in cases of
aggravated rape, forcible rape, and aggravated sexual battery or aggravated oral sexual battery,
id. §§ 14:42, 14:42.1; 14:43.2; 14:43.4, setting up a general rule that requires "aggravation" for the
spousal offender but not for the comparable nonspousal offender.
51. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-99 (1999).
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without the consent of the alleged victim."52 But this amendment is
only a partial repeal. The general nonspousal "sexual battery" statute
provides only that the conduct be accomplished without consent 3
although the statute on sexual battery by a spouse requires a showing
of "force." 4
Marital rape immunities thus live on between the "general" rape
statutes and special "spousal" statutes. Understanding precisely how
this works can often be a rather complex process, rivaling the
unraveling of tax code regulations. Consider the difficulty of
Maryland's statutory scheme. Maryland provides that "a person may
not be prosecuted under [a certain set of statutes] ... if the victim is
the person's legal spouse," except as provided in that statute.5 5 The
statute then goes on to permit prosecution under some sections, but
only some sections, of the nonspousal statutes. These sections vary
depending upon whether the parties are separated pursuant to a
written agreement, separated pursuant to a limited divorce, or if the
offense is accomplished by using force "against the will and without
the consent of the person's legal spouse. ' 56  Leaving aside the
complications of separation agreements and limited divorce,5 7 the
still-married spouse has significant hurdles to overcome that are not
applicable to nonspouses. For example, the spouse-victim must show
"force," not simply a "threat of force. '5 8  Thus, a spouse may be
prosecuted for a forceful rape under the first-degree rape statute59 but
not for a rape accomplished by "threat of force," 6 as for example, a
52. Id. (emphasis added).
53. Id. § 97-3-95(1) ("A person is guilty of sexual battery if he or she engages in sexual
penetration with: (a) Another person without his or her consent; (b) A mentally defective,
mentally incapacitated or physically helpless person .....
54. Id. § 97-3-99.
55. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 464D(a) (1996).
56. Id. § 464D(c)(1).
57. For an attempt to explain some of these distinctions, without any focus on the more
detailed analysis above, see Lane v. Maryland, 703 A.2d 180 (Md. 1997).
58. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 464D(c).
59. Id. § 462(a) (Supp. 1999).
60. Id. § 464D(c). Maryland's first-degree rape statute covers rapes "by force or threat of
force," where the defendant "[t]hreatens or places the victim in fear that the victim or any
person known to the victim will be imminently subjected to death," id. § 462(a)(3), or where the
defendant commits the offense "aided and abetted" by others. Id. § 462(a)(4). The spousal
exemption does not bar prosecution under this statute per se, see id. § 464D(c)(2)(i), but
requires an additional burden-force-thus implicitly excluding anything less, such as a threat
of force. Therefore, if a husband accomplishes the rape by a threat to kill rather than force
itself, he may not be prosecuted for the first-degree rape offense; similarly, if he issues a threat
of force but does not use force and is aided by others, he may not be prosecuted for first-degree
rape, even if he would be so prosecuted if the victim were a stranger.
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husband who threatens to kill his wife and proceeds to have vaginal
intercourse without her consent. 61  Moreover, this scheme also
exempts spousal sexual offenses under some parts of the second-
degree rape statute, some parts of the third-degree sexual offense
statute, and the full fourth-degree sexual offense statute.62  The
bottom line is that, in Maryland, if you accomplish sexual intercourse
by threatening to kill your wife, you have not committed first-degree
rape, but you have if you similarly threaten a stranger. Indeed,
because of the way rape is defined, you can threaten to kidnap your
wife or bring along a few others to "aid and abet" sexual intercourse,
and this conduct could not be prosecuted as first-degree rape,
although it would be if the victim were a stranger. 63  Maryland,
unfortunately, is not the only state in which this kind of complex
"partial repeal" governs marital rape.64
That these inequalities remain on the statute books should be
surprising, not only because many believe that the marital rape
exemption has been banished, but also because marital rape
differentials have been widely held to be unconstitutional. 65 All of the
prominent reasons used to justify marital rape rules, such as privacy
and family harmony, fear of vindictive complaints, and problems of
proof, have fared poorly in the face of equal protection and statutory
61. One might argue that the spousal rapist could be prosecuted under Maryland's "sexual
offense" statutes, id. § 464 (first-degree sexual offense); id. § 464A (second-degree sexual
offense), since these sections are never mentioned in the marital defense statute, id. § 464D, and
they lead to penalties comparable to the rape offenses. The only problem with this construction
is that Maryland's first- and second-degree sexual offense statutes only cover particular kinds of
"sexual act[s]"; they do not cover vaginal intercourse. See id. § 461(e) (defining "[s]exual act" as
"cunnilingus, felatio, analingus, or anal intercourse, but does not include vaginal intercourse").
Treating these "sexual acts" as capable of prosecution against a spouse, although vaginal
intercourse is not, yields a rather odd result. In any event, it remains the case that the "rape"
offenses are not available to charge the spousal defendant unless there is a showing of force, id.
§ 464D(c), and that neither the sexual offenses statutes, id. §§ 464, 464A, nor the sexual contact
offenses, id. §§ 464B, 464C, are available for an act of vaginal intercourse. See id. § 461(f)
(exempting from "sexual contact" penetration by "the penis, mouth, or tongue" into the
"genital or anal opening of another person's body").
62. The spousal statute, id. § 464D(c), allows prosecution where the act is committed with
force under three specified offenses: section 462(a) (all subsections of first-degree rape statute);
section 463(a)(1) (first of three subsections of second-degree rape statute); and section
464B(a)(1)(i)-(ii) (two subsections of the third-degree sexual offense statute) as long as the
prosecution can show "force." The statute specifically bars prosecutions under non-enumerated
subsections of 463 (second-degree rape), 464B (third-degree sexual offenses), and 464C (fourth-
degree sexual offenses) through the "marital defense," provided in section 464D(a).
63. See supra note 60.
64. There are a number of varying "lists" of the states that have marital rape
differentials/immunities, see, e.g., Hasday, supra note 47, at 1 nn.1-3 (citing statutes); West,
supra note 47, at 46-49 (citing statutes); but, without really examining the statutes in detail, it is
often difficult to see how this is accomplished.
65. See supra notes 43-45 (discussing equal protection cases).
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challenges. Courts from Alabama to Illinois to New York have
rejected the notion that the marital relationship of the parties
somehow makes the offense less worthy of prosecution. 66 They have
called the reconciliation argument "absurd," 67 warning that "it is the
violent act of rape and not the subsequent attempt of the wife to seek
protection through the criminal justice system which 'disrupts' a
marriage." 68 They have openly rejected the notion that marital rape
should not be a crime because it is likely to lead to false charges,
stating that "[t]here is no other crime we can think of in which all of
the victims are denied protection simply because someone might
fabricate a charge. ' 69 They have denied that proof problems justify
lack of equal treatment, finding that "the problem of proving lack of
consent is likely to be present in most cases in which the alleged
victim and perpetrator have had a prior consensual sexual
relationship regardless of whether they were married or unmarried." 70
Finally, courts have been openly hostile to the notion of "privacy" as
justifying marital differentials, asserting that "[w]hile protecting
marital privacy and encouraging reconciliation are legitimate State
interests, there is no rational relation between allowing a husband to
forcibly rape his wife and these interests."'71
Given this set of precedents and a constitutional basis for
challenge, 72 why do these statutes remain on the books? There are
66. See supra notes 44-45.
67. Weishaupt v. Commonwealth, 315 S.E.2d 847, 855 (Va. 1984) ("Weishaupt's third
argument is that to allow a husband to be convicted of raping his wife will be disruptive to
marriages. He contends that the possibility of reconciliation will be foreclosed. This argument is
absurd." (emphasis added)); see also People v. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567, 574 (N.Y. 1984) ("[lIt is
not tenable to argue that elimination of the marital exemption would disrupt marriages because
it would discourage reconciliation.").
6& Liberta, 474 N.E.2d at 574 (citing Weishaupt, 315 S.E.2d at 855); see also Merton v.
State, 500 So. 2d 1301, 1304 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986) (adopting Liberta's rationale); People v.
M. D., 595 N.E.2d 702, 711-12 (I11. App. Ct. 1992) ("[I]f a marriage has deteriorated to the point
where one spouse commits a forcible sexual assault upon the other and the victim desires to see
the perpetrator imprisoned, reconciliation is hardly a likely prospect.").
69. Warren v. State, 336 S.E.2d 221, 225 (Ga. 1985). The court also noted that "there is no
evidence that wives have flooded the district attorneys with revenge filled trumped-up charges."
Id.; see also Merton, 500 So. 2d at 1304 ("[I]f the possibility of fabricated complaints were a basis
for not criminalizing behavior which would otherwise be sanctioned, virtually all crimes other
than homicides would go unpunished.").
70. M. D., 595 N.E.2d at 712.
71. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d at 574; see also State v. Rider, 449 So. 2d 903, 906 n.6 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1984) ("The marital privacy right recognized by the United States Supreme Court ... may
not be used as a justification for immunity from prosecution for sexual battery.");
Commonwealth v. Shoemaker, 518 A.2d 591, 594 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) ("The right to privacy
within the marital relationship is not absolute and, in this case, must be balanced against the
state's interest in protecting an individual's right to the integrity of his or her own body.").
72. Typically, a rational basis argument is very easy to rebut, simply requiring some
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some practical reasons. First, potential victims have no standing to
sue for equal protection violations, and defendants (who benefit from
downgraded penalties and partial immunities) typically have no
incentive to make such a claim. Male defendants brought the early
claims; and once courts consistently refused to benefit them,
defendants stopped making the claims. Thus, the constitutional
norms that purportedly govern, norms of equality, have little clout.
Second, as we have seen above, the discarded norms of relationship
are powerfully resistant to change. Legislatures have been prodded
in many jurisdictions to tinker with these rules, but the effort quickly
encounters the very reasons rejected by courts as "illegitimate" or
"illogical" or "absurd." Indeed, one reads of legislators giving voice
explicitly to the notion that the relationship should control, echoing
seemingly ancient sentiments that "[i]f you can't rape your wife, who
can you rape?" 73
Third, and as important, there are places for these norms to hide.
How could the average citizen/advocate/reformer possibly untangle
the Maryland statute? Indeed, even for scholars of rape law, the time
and effort to try to discover the precise interconnections between the
exemptions and their relationship to general nonspousal statutes is
relatively exhausting and largely unknown. It is within this
complexity that the norms of relationship live on and hold court,
albeit silently. Once within these statutes, moreover, this becomes a
reason in and of itself to sustain the current system. The stratified
rape law, which serves as the template for the marital rape
immunities,74 is often favored by prosecutors as providing them with
legitimate reason for the statute's distinctions. Interestingly enough here, the vast majority of
courts addressing these statutes have been willing to find no "rational" basis. See supra notes
43-44 (citing several cases where courts have found no rational basis to sustain marital
exemption statutes). Some have found this less than comforting, finding that marital rape
exemptions endure "despite their apparent unconstitutionality," because of the "inadequacy of
the dominant or mainstream political theory of equality." See West, supra note 47, at 49-50. I
do not disagree with that as an abstract matter; indeed, I believe that existing equal protection
doctrine has failed to understand the way in which norms of intimate relationships must enter
the equality analysis. My point here is simply that courts have not been timid in rejecting the
most prevalent justifications for marital rape exemptions. That, in turn, sets up an interesting
juxtaposition between a law that simultaneously rejects marital rape exemptions as "absurd"
and, at the same time, lets them live on in statutes throughout the country.
73. Eskow, supra note 23, at 689 (quoting 1979 statement of California State Senator Bob
Wilson); see also id. at 696-97 (reporting statements in 1992 debate on California's marital rape
statute suggesting legislators do not see the public treating a marital rape as seriously as a
traditional rape).
74. Rape law reform courted complexity in the 1970s and 1980s on the theory that many
offenses of different grades would increase prosecutorial discretion and thus increase the
chances of convictions. See Homey & Spohn, supra note 10, at 523 ("Many states replaced the
single crime of rape with a series of offenses graded by seriousness and with commensurate
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the most flexibility in deciding the appropriate charge and by defense
counsel as providing the most lenient penalties. The parties who
work "in the system" thus have little incentive to change and, indeed,
have been found embracing separate marital rape treatment (even
when it creates inequalities). Metanorms of flexibility and leniency
become a friendly shield that allows legislators to avoid openly
avowing what they really believe-that marital rape is a lesser crime.
The discarded norms in which the relationship is more important than
the violence still hold true; they simply remain hidden within
complexity's claims for legitimacy.
Professor Nancy Lemon's 1992 experience attempting to reform
the California marital rape exemption is illustrative here.75 Among
other things, Lemon sought three major reforms: (1) to bring parity to
penalties for stranger and marital rape by eliminating the
misdemeanor treatment for marital rape; (2) to eliminate the "prompt
complaint" rule requiring notification of marital rapes within ninety
days; and (3) to dissolve the "separate" marital rape statute.7 6
Presumably, this should have been an easy reform, if the equal
protection cases are any measure. And yet, it was a difficult process
in which Lemon was never able to rid the law of the "separate"
statute or to eliminate completely the prompt complaint rule.77
Instead, reformers obtained felony treatment for forcible marital
rapes by agreeing not to eliminate the separate spousal statute. 78 As
Lemon warned, separate rules for married women have required
continued legislative attention and revision to avoid exacerbating or
creating inequalities between the general and spousal statutes.79
Who stood up for the "separate" treatment in California? The
lawyers-the group that one might have thought would stand for
constitutional norms of equality. Some of the arguments legislators
penalties."). It was against this template of a graduated series of sexual offenses that reformers
of the marital rape exemption found themselves working and in whose interstices one can find
today's odd marital rape rules.
75. See Krysten Crawford, Boalt Lecturer Rewrites the Rules on a Wife's Right to Say 'No',
RECORDER, Nov. 22, 1993, at 3; Eskow, supra note 23, at 696-98 (describing Lemon's efforts).
76. See Crawford, supra note 75, at 3.
77. See id.
7& See id. ("The new statute abolishes the misdemeanor penalty, making all marital rapes
felonies punishable by up to eight years in prison .... The amended law didn't come without
some important concessions, the most significant of which keeps California's marital and
nonmarital rape laws as separate Penal Code sections.").
79. See id. ("My discomfort," Lemon says, "is that as long as we have two separate code
sections, non-marital rape [Penal Code §261] will be strengthened .... We will have to watch all
rape bills like a hawk." (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 261 (West 1999)); Eskow, supra note 23, at
697.
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raised in support of separate treatment were the ones already rejected
by courts (difficulties of proof, false claims, and the need to maintain
marital relationships),8° but, in the end, the day was carried against
reform not by these arguments but by their more veiled counterparts.
The district attorneys' association, the criminal defense bar, and the
American Civil Liberties Union all opposed various reforms of the
marital rape statute and wanted to sustain its "separateness." 81 They
did not openly adhere to the discarded norms of yesteryear; instead,
they claimed that the inequalities were really "better" for seemingly
neutral reasons-better for defendants, better for an already
overburdened criminal justice system, and, most interestingly, better
for women. The complex, separate, and largely redundant statute-
however it symbolized the "difference" of marital rape-made it
easier for prosecutors to prosecute, they said. As one prosecutor put
it, "the relationship acts as mitigation,"82 making jurors perceive
spousal rape as a crime less serious than nonspousal rape.83 That, of
course, does not answer the question why the law should continue to
perpetuate and express that view; it simply trades on the supposedly-
discarded position that the relationship discounts the violence and
that the law can and should do nothing about it.
In short, marital rape tells a story of discarded norms and how
they continue to live. Here, they live on "between statutes" and
because the resulting complexity is defended in apparently neutral,
procedural terms. Competing metanorms of flexibility and ease of
administration occlude the ways in which the norms of "relationship"
continue to blind us to the nature of the violence, signify consent, and
raise fears of false claims-the very arguments that courts rejected
fifteen years ago in Liberta as untenable, absurd, and unfair.84
Clothed within purportedly friendly arguments about the ease of
prosecution and often blocked from constitutional challenge, the
relationship remains normatively resilient. The result is a banal
sexism in a world that believes sexism in the criminal law is dead, a
world in which you can threaten to kill your wife, proceed to have sex
against her will, and still commit something less than real rape.
80. See Eskow, supra note 23, at 696-97.
81. E-mail interview with Nancy Lemon, Jan. 10, 2000.
82. Eskow, supra note 23, at 701 (quoting Linda Eufusia, Deputy District Attorney in San
Mateo County's Sexual Assault Unit).
83. See id.
84. See supra text accompanying notes 65-71.
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C. Battered Women and Self-Defense
One of the very odd things about some feminist reforms in the
criminal law is their ability to continue to generate controversy even
after the reforms themselves have become ingrained in the law. For
every "noncontroversial" feminist reform that stands unimplemented,
there remain widely implemented reforms that continue to be
"controversial." Battered woman syndrome evidence is the classic
example. Almost every state in the nation now accepts battered
woman syndrome testimony.85 Indeed, courts in many jurisdictions
have used battered woman syndrome evidence as a template for
nonfeminist claims-claims of siblings, children, and even parents. 86
Whether or not those rulings are correct, they exist and are not
particularly controversial for courts (even if they should be).
The question this raises is why courts have so willingly embraced
battered woman syndrome evidence while controversy about the
syndrome increases in intensity. There is more writing deeply
skeptical of the syndrome than ever before. Scholars, writing both for
academic and popular audiences, have reviled the syndrome, urging
that it lacks scientific validity, wreaks havoc with the law of self-
defense, and may help to excuse executioners. 87 Feminist reform
remains oddly questionable, somehow illegitimate, and apparently
political even though courts and legislatures have accepted syndrome
evidence quite easily. The gist of the argument centers on the
implication that the syndrome effectively changes the law "for
battered women" and provides them a "special defense." As a legal
85. As of 1995, one study found that "[e]xpert testimony on battering and its effects" had
been held admissible, at least in part, in "each of the 50 states and the District of Columbia" and
that "[t]welve states have enacted statutes providing for the admissibility of expert testimony."
Janet Parrish, Trend Analysis: Expert Testimony on Battering and Its Effects in Criminal Cases,
11 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 75, 81-83 (1996). The report noted, however, that "18 states have also
excluded expert testimony in some cases." Id. at 83.
86. See, e.g., State v. Nemeth, 694 N.E.2d 1332 (Ohio 1998) (battered child syndrome
evidence admissible in case of child accused of murdering parent); People v. Colberg, 701
N.Y.S.2d 608 (N.Y. Co. Ct. 1999) (battered person syndrome evidence admissible in case of
father accused of murdering adult son); Commonwealth v. Kacsmar, 617 A.2d 725 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1992) (battered person syndrome evidence admissible in case of fratricide); State v. Janes,
850 P.2d 495 (Wash. 1993) (battered child syndrome evidence admissible in case of child
accused of murdering parent).
87. See, e.g., WILSON, supra note 5, at 56 ("The position that so many judges and legislators
have taken is scientifically suspect, philosophically debatable, and legally unnecessary."); id. at
62-66 (discussing battered women's nonconfrontational killings and suggesting that changes in
the law authorize "private, paid executions" in such cases); Faigman & Wright, supra note 5, at
76-79 (questioning the validity of studies supporting battered woman syndrome and concluding,
id. at 79, that "the integrity of legal doctrine has suffered immensely from the syndrome's
spread across the landscape.").
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matter, this is not correct; there is no separate "battered women's"
defense and courts routinely insist that they are not changing the
law. 88 And yet, doubts about this conclusion persist in the academic
literature .89
The problem with all of this lies in the overarching assumption
that the syndrome implicitly aims to "change" the law of self-defense
in ways that are, at best, political or favoritist. I believe that there is
reason to doubt that normative claim. Indeed, for the student of self-
defense law, the legal norms embodied in the syndrome are so
conventional that if one were to encapsulate the syndrome in a set of
jury instructions (rather than in expert psychological testimony), what
you would end up with could all be supported by nineteenth-century
law citations. The syndrome does many things: among them, it
emphasizes the importance of past threats and the severity of the
anticipated harm. Perhaps more importantly, it attempts to rebut the
claim that the defendant should have left and focuses the jury on the
defendant's perception of the events and her situation.90 There is
nothing inconsistent between any of these notions, however, and
established self-defense law. Since the nineteenth century, past
threats and violence, including the victim's character for violence,
have been considered highly relevant to a claim of self-defense, on
questions of imminence, aggression, and threat.91 In 1888, courts
would charge juries that the reasonable person is not to be judged by
some "ideal" standard but that the jury was "to put themselves in the
position of the assailed person, with his physical and mental
equipment, surrounded with the circumstances and exposed to the
influences with which he was surrounded, and to which he was
exposed at the time." 92 Similarly, it was well established then that the
88. See, e.g., State v. Koss, 551 N.E.2d 970, 974 (Ohio 1990) ("Thus, admission of expert
testimony regarding the battered woman syndrome does not establish a new defense or
justification. Rather, it is to assist the trier of fact [to] determin[e] whether the defendant acted
out of an honest belief that she was in imminent danger .....
89. See supra note 87.
90. See Faigman & Wright, supra note 5, at 82-88; Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and
Self-Defense: Myths and Misconceptions in Current Reform Proposals, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 379,
426-27 (1991); Parrish, supra note 85, at 85.
91. See, e.g., People v. Thomson, 28 P. 589, 590 (Cal. 1891). The court stated that
[u]nder these circumstances, all the acts and conduct of the deceased, either in the
nature of overt acts of hostility or threats communicated or uncommunicated, were
proper evidence to be considered by the jury as shedding light-to some extent at
least-upon the issue as to whether the deceased or the defendant was the aggressor in
this fatal affray. These principles are elementary in criminal law, and a citation of
authorities not demanded ....
Id.
92. United States v. King, 34 F. 302, 309 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1888). The jury was charged as
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defendant's perception of the victim's threat, rather than an actual
threat, was sufficient to establish self-defense if the perception was
reasonable (indeed, this was and still is known as the "appearances"
rule).93 Finally, it was well established that one does not
automatically provoke an incident or become an aggressor by walking
into a dangerous situation or staying in a dangerous place-whether
that dangerous situation is a barroom brawl or a shootout at the O.K.
Corral. There is no pre-retreat rule for dangerous situations,
marriages included. 94
If this is true, and the syndrome's legal propositions95 are not
terribly controversial, 96 this may help explain why so many courts
have been so willing to accept the substance of the expert testimony
even if there remain commentators that express recurring doubts
about its form as a "syndrome" or its necessity as "expert"
testimony.97  But, more importantly, courts may have gravitated
toward this testimony because judges have a vague, unarticulated
intuition that the rules work well for strangers but not for those
involved in intimate relationships. I recently conducted a study of
self-defense cases that attempts to show that the reason the rules do
not work well is because the relationship between the parties provides
follows:
[I]n determining whether it is founded on reasonable grounds, the jury are not to
conceive of some ideally reasonable person, but they are to put themselves in the
position of the assailed person, with his physical and mental equipment, surrounded
with the circumstances and exposed to the influences with which he was surrounded,
and to which he was exposed at the time. If, with these tests applied... the jury are
satisfied that there was then an apparently imminent danger of death or grievous
bodily harm to the person assailed, he is entitled to act upon the appearances.
Id.
93. See id.
94. See, e.g., Ball v. State, 29 Tex. App. 107, 125-26 (Tex. Ct. App. 1890) ("Defendant's
presence at the place where the killing occurred could not, under the circumstances, constitute
provocation to the deceased."); State v. Bristol, 53 Wyo. 304 (1938) (Defendant had no duty to
avoid entering a bar where he knew his adversary-who had threatened to attack him-to be
drinking.); ANDREW ASHWORTH, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 147 (3d ed. 1999) (noting that
English self-defense law protects the freedom to move, excepting from the duty to avoid
violence, claims "in those cases where [the defendant] is acting lawfully in remaining at, or going
to, a place" and that American law "takes the point further").
95. The emphasis here is on the "legal propositions" for which the syndrome stands. As
can readily be noted by my summary, I make absolutely no claim about the psychological
validity of the syndrome, a topic on which I have no opinion nor the expertise to entertain one.
96. Curiously, those who do know something about self-defense law have noted the
seeming parallels between the syndrome and self-defense law, and cite those parallels as a
reason to condemn the syndrome. See Faigman & Wright, supra note 5, at 88-89 ("[T]he
syndrome so closely parallels the law of self-defense that its basic parameters appear to be
controlled more by legal convenience than by psychological observation or theory.").
97. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
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the norms, and those norms overwhelm the law.98 Let's face it,
battered women's cases are about the legal relevance of leaving.
Judges and juries want battered women to leave before they kill (as
we all do). The important question for most battered women's cases,
however, is the legal relevance of departure to the standard case of
confrontational self-defense. The man who walks into the dangerous
bar for the fiftieth time or walks into a dangerous neighborhood for
the eightieth does not lose his self-defense claim because he should
have "left" before the knife was above his head.99 If the law is
imposing such a rule on battered women in confrontational situations,
then it is imposing a special disadvantage on those women, not a
special advantage. Under this view, the syndrome becomes a kind of
"normal" corrective to a law whose normative references risk
unbalance: in confrontational cases, something like the syndrome,
perhaps simply in the form of jury instructions, is necessary to remind
the law of self-defense of its own commitments. Put another way,
such testimony is necessary to rebut the implicit norm that there is a
"pre-retreat" rule, a rule requiring defendants to "leave" dangerous
places or relationships simply because they are dangerous. 1°°
To see the power of the norms demanding "departure"-in what
should be a classic self-defense situation- consider the case of
Barbara Watson.101 Watson was on the ground, and her husband's
hands "around [her] neck," but the trial court found that she did not
kill in self-defense because the threat against her was not
"imminent." 102 (Self-defense generally requires a finding that the
defendant used deadly force only when faced with an imminent threat
of death or great bodily harm.)103 As the appellate court reported it,
the trial judge believed the threat was not imminent because of "[his]
view of the parties' relationship involving 'a long course of physical
98. Victoria F. Nourse, Killing Time (draft manuscript, on file with author) (analyzing self-
defense cases raising the issue of "imminence").
99. See supra note 94.
100. If I am correct, it would contravene basic self-defense law not to give an instruction
that explained to the jury the difference between a retreat rule (which some states require in the
event of confrontation) and a pre-retreat rule, which would require the defendant to avoid
dangerous situations altogether.
101. Commonwealth v. Watson, 431 A.2d 949, 950-51 (Pa. 1981).
102. Id. at 951. As the Watson court emphasized, "[t]he central issue in this case stems from
the trial court's finding that appellant's belief-that she was in imminent danger... was
unreasonable." Id. (emphasis added).
103. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTt, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 5.7
(1986).
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abuse." ' 1° Put bluntly, the trial judge thought Watson should have
left before her husband's hands were around her neck. Of course, he
did not express it that way. He used the apparently neutral, but quite
difficult, imminence category and filled it up with social norms about
Watson's "proper" relationship to her husband and her responsibility
for that relationship. Indeed, in reversing, this is precisely what the
appellate court found,105 rejecting as questionable the notion that the
violence could not be "imminent" because of the "parties'
relationship.' 106
To be sure, Watson's case may be unusual. °w But that it could
happen at all suggests the ability of the norms of relationship to
overpower the law's own commitments as well as the ease with which
such norms are hidden-here, within the concept of "imminence."
The Watson trial court could not possibly have held as it did without
believing that "imminence" amounted to a kind of "leave-him-first"
rule, a rule imposing responsibility for the relationship, including its
violence, on the defendant. But there were many ways in which the
doctrine might have lent some apparent (although ultimately
unavailing) support to that conclusion. The law of self-defense does
often require that the defendant avoid the violence once it starts
(sometimes known as the retreat rule).108 Similarly, the law does
reject the self-defense claims of those who "provoke" the violence or
104. Watson, 431 A.2d at 951. I have left out here, but do not mean to slight, the end of this
sentence which indicates that the trial court also believed that the defendant's response was
disproportionate since the victim did not have a weapon. Id. It is well-established self-defense
law, however, without regard to battered women, that a physical struggle, particularly where the
parties are of unequal size or physical capacity, may be met with deadly force. See State v.
Wanrow, 559 P.2d 548, 556, 558-59 (Wash. 1977) (en banc).
105. Watson, 431 A.2d at 951-52 ("A woman whose husband has repeatedly subjected her to
physical abuse does not, by choosing to maintain her family relationship with that husband and
their children, consent to or assume the risk of further abuse.").
106. Id. at 951.
107. Watson is not unusual in one sense: the tendency to use "imminence" as a catch-all to
incorporate a number of the other requirements of self-defense law (including retreat rules in
nonretreat jurisdictions) is not limited to the battered women's cases; if my research is right, it is
a common feature of self-defense cases. Indeed, contrary to the general assumption, the vast
majority of appellate cases raising imminence as a relevant legal issue are not cases of
nonconfrontational homicide-cases in which battered women or others kill long after the last
threat. Indeed, this goes a long way to showing that imminence does not, as conventionally
assumed, simply amount to "clock time." It is precisely because the clock is not at issue-
because the hands are around the defendants' necks-that imminence takes on other meanings,
as it has since its origins in the early common law notion of "sudden affray." See Nourse, supra
note 98.
108. This rule applies in a minority of jurisdictions; it has proven to be of continuing
controversy throughout the history of the law of self-defense. See Dan M. Kahan, The Secret
Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REv. 413,429-35 (1999).
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create the conditions of their own defense. 1°9 The only problem with
these "legitimate" reasons is that, when applied to the relationship
(and not the violence), they create a rule that the law has never
announced-that a woman loses her right of self-defense merely
because she is married.
Unfortunately, lawyerly conventions themselves may be
responsible for this state of affairs. Addressing the problems of self-
defense in general, academics and lawyers, feminists and nonfeminists
alike, have focused on the question whether the law should soften its
standards for the odd and difficult cases involving battered women
who kill their sleeping husbands long after the threat has long
subsided °10 Talk of self-defense thus becomes a question of whether
the legal standard is appropriately subjective or objective. This
discourse does a fine job of providing a conclusion (subjectivity
equals bad; objectivity equals good), but it tells us very little about
what the content of the rules should be and, crucially, what we really
mean by "necessary" self-defense (in battered women's cases or
anyone else's). Must a defendant really exhaust all "legal
alternatives" before exercising the right of self-defense? The law has
never uniformly required this. If we believed such an "avoid-
violence-at-all-costs" rule were appropriate, then why is it
noncontroversial that we have no shoot-'em-in-the-foot rule; or why
have a majority of jurisdictions rejected a retreat rule? When we say
of self-defense that it is necessary, why do almost all jurisdictions
allow people to kill in the face of a threat that they know is serious
but not life-threatening?
These questions recede in importance, however, once objectivity
and subjectivity become the central focus. Perspective, rather than
meaning, becomes the controlling issue. And, once that is the
question, it follows fairly clearly that urging justice for battered
women means seeking a political, self-interested, and weaker
109. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 103.
110. One of the premises of the debate, albeit one for which there is little empirical support,
is that battered women's cases are, like Judy Norman's, primarily ones of long-delayed
homicidal attacks. See, e.g., David L. Faigman, Note, The Battered Woman Syndrome and Self-
Defense: A Legal and Empirical Dissent, 72 VA. L. REV. 619, 621 (1986) ("Frequently, however,
a battered woman kills her mate after an attack has ended or at some time when, seemingly, no
immediate threat is present."); Cathryn Rosen, The Excuse of Self-Defense: Correcting a
Historical Accident on Behalf of Battered Women Who Kill, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 11, 43 (1986)
("Most battered woman's defense cases involve situations in which the defendant was not, in
fact, in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm at her victim's hands."). But see
Maguigan, supra note 90 (arguing that most appellate cases involve confrontational, rather than
nonconfrontational claims).
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standard for the "weaker" sex. When this issue is framed as one of
subjectivity and objectivity, the only thing about which we can argue
is whether the rules are really rules or exceptions, rather than the
content of those rules. In this sense, subjectivity/objectivity talk
keeps the syndrome controversial. Because the only legal basis on
which the syndrome appears to rest is "subjectivity," it always
appears as politics in legal guise.
The story of battered woman syndrome is a story like the ones I
have recounted: we have vague legal concepts harboring unresolved
social norms, sometimes disavowing and even contradicting the law's
overt commitments. The law of self-defense does not generally
require that the defendant "leave" before the attack has started; it
clearly disavows the notion that married women lose their right of
self-defense; and, by embracing syndrome evidence, it even attempts
to rebut juries' implicit judgments that a battered woman must leave
the relationship before the deadly attack. And, yet, these overt
commitments may be shattered by social norms that demand, like
they did of Barbara Watson, precisely the contrary-norms that are
not openly stated but instead are disguised in the apparently objective
judgments of imminence and necessity.
In summary, all of these problems are exacerbated here, not by
the processes of legislative reform, but by the habits of the legal
academy and courts. Debate about the syndrome has tended to
revolve around whether it creates a "special" rule for women in
significant part because of the prevalence of objectivity/subjectivity
discourse. There is good reason to suspect, however, that this
discourse leads to diversion. Battered women's cases-whether
confrontational or nonconfrontational -raise difficult questions
because the law of self-defense is neither as transparent nor as settled
as many hope or believe, and because the resulting ambiguities are
vulnerable to powerful social norms. The great unanswered questions
of self-defense law-questions about the meaning of imminence and
retreat and necessity-are not likely to be resolved by a debate about
subjectivity and objectivity. And, as long as they are not resolved,
these meanings may well be provided not by the law's best judgments,
but by society's worst judgments-by societal norms about
relationships that contradict the law's own aspirations.
CONCLUSION
It simply defies reality to conclude that there has not been
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significant feminist reform in the criminal law-there has. The
interesting and challenging part is to understand how and when
success lives with failure. This is worth investigating in its own right
so that we may better understand the odd, discontinuities of reform
rather than simply assuming the impossibility of change or the ease of
effectuating it.
I have argued that feminism contests powerful social norms
about intimate relationships, which makes reform intensely
controversial in very personal ways. People resist feminism because it
seems to place them in positions in which they may have to question
their most intimate relationships, their identity, and their daily lives.
At the same time, this resistance, when overcome by legal reform, is
likely to remain embedded in reform efforts, albeit in ways that are
difficult to see, helping to perpetuate that which the law openly
disavows.
Perhaps it is no wonder, then, that we live in a world of feminist
success and failure in the criminal law. The resulting inequalities,
however, should be cause for great concern not only among feminists,
but also among criminal law scholars generally. Social norms of
inequality have tended to perpetuate themselves in the criminal law,
despite the law's disavowals for reasons beyond feminism itself. First,
constitutional litigation, a typical source of normative challenge,
provides little relief for crime victims; not only is it very difficult for
potential victims to get into court to assert an equal protection claim,
but the federal courts remain wedded to the principle that they do not
want to "involve" themselves in the substantive criminal law
(particularly criminal laws affecting women) lest they become courts
of domestic jurisdiction."1 Second, the norm-entrepreneurs of the
criminal law academy have remained largely silent. At least until
quite recently, the entire idea that norms could or did affect the
criminal law was seen as "off limits," as a kind of terrible
acknowledgment of the power of the community to destroy the
individual. Criminal law theory is deeply positivistic; it proceeds
upon the assumption that social norms are not the business of the law
itself but in fact must be relegated to the institutional world of the
111. See, e.g., Rehnquist: Is Federalism Dead?, LEGAL TIMEs, May 18, 1998, at 12. The
Legal Times reported Chief Justice Rehnquist's remarks before the American Law Institute,
which were critical of efforts in Congress to increase the criminal law jurisdiction of the federal
courts on the grounds that these matters should be left to the state. Chief Justice Rehnquist
included the Violence Against Women Act, a civil rights remedy, within his catalog of "criminal
law" statutes. See id.
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jury. When theory blinds itself to the power of norms to change and
affect law, it pushes legal reform into theoretically unstable positions.
Even reforms that are widely accepted by courts are somehow seen as
"political" (in the pejorative sense of that term) rather than
principled."2
Feminist reform has been generating, and no doubt will continue
to generate, discontinuous results in the criminal law and elsewhere.
By this, I mean that the old discarded norms will live on beside the
new ones, beckoning as if in perpetual challenge. If this is right,
judgments of any statutory reform's futility or success must be issued
with caution. At the same time, there is no reason for a sense of
defeatism or of failed feminism. In urging that reform's failures may
be "normal," I am simply suggesting that legal reform is a work in
progress. Statutory reform rarely ends anything. It may transform
the debate, yet it would be naive to believe that it could "end" a
matter as ancient as sexism. This does not mean that reform is futile,
but it may simply mean that reform demands perpetual vigilance. To
paraphrase Reva Siegel (in another context): "[s]o long as we view
[reform] in static and homogenous terms.., it is plausible to imagine
ourselves at the end of history, finally and conclusively repudiating
centuries of racial and gender inequality.11 3 For reformers, there is
no time to pause as if we are at "the end of history." There simply is
too much "unfinished business" in the criminal law.
112. See, e.g., WILSON, supra note 5, at 68, 112 (criticizing battered women's claims as
seeking to "invent a new standard of personal accountability," id. at 68, and suggesting the
acceptance of these claims is "[m]otivated by empathy for some group of disadvantaged
defendants," id. at 112).
113. Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-
Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1114 (1997).
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